Alors a ce propos, je citerai l'excellent article de "The Economist", qui est pourtant un fervant supporter de l'action militaire en Iraq. Cela ne les empeche pas de dresser dans le meme numero un article (dont le titre fait la couverture : "Pourquoi la guerre en Iraq serait justifiée") pour virer sadam par la force s'il le faut, et cet article intitulé : "The Economic risks", un article qui devrait finir de convaincre qu'une guerre est la pire des choses qui puisse arriver.
Je vais quoter les principaux points de l'article (il est trop long en lui meme) donc forcement en anglais, desolé. Je vais voir si j'en traduis ou resume un bout, mais j'ai pas les courage et le temps la
trying to assess the economic consequences of such an attack is tricky because of the vast number of unknowns and contingencies.
Ca c'est juste pour dire que tout ce qui suit n'est que supposition, estimation etc... en s'en serait douté, mais c'est bon a rappeler.
He argues that the risks to the global economy, taken together, are now greater than at any time since the 1973-74 oil crisis. Even if the war goes well, he argues, it will probably not be the panacea that investors are hoping for. The aftermath of war will be uncertain; the risk of terrorist acts will remain; and there are plenty of other worries too, not least over North Korea.
The cost of fighting
The economic costs of a war can be broken into three types. First, there are the direct military costs.
Assuming a similarly short war [la guerre du golf], America's Congressional Budget Office and the House Budget Committee have both estimated a total military cost of around $50 billion, or 0.5% of America's GDP. Others reckon that a more protracted war could cost America as much as $150 billion.
Second, there are the potentially far larger indirect costs of peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction. William Nordhaus, an economist at Yale University, thinks that these could cost America between $100 billion and $600 billion over the next decade.
Last but not least, there are the macroeconomic costs of lost output.Mr Nordhaus estimates that the total cost of a war to America could range between $100 billion and $1.9 trillion, spread over a ten-year period. That could be as much as 2% of American GDP for every year of the decade.
La je me rends compte que j'ai oublié de preciser quand j'ai coupé des passages, ca me parrait important.. je el fais maintenant.
Broadly speaking, a war in Iraq could affect economies through four main channels: oil prices; stockmarkets; the dollar; and business and consumer confidence. (...)
The conventional wisdom is that prices will fall sharply once a war is over, just as they did in 1991. Then they fell from over $40 to below pre-war levels after the ground war had begun. Optimists today argue that a victory will liberate Iraqi oil as well as its people. (This assumes that the Iraqis do not sabotage their own oilfields or those of their neighbours.)
(...)[But] Economists at Goldman Sachs argue that the recent rise in oil prices has had more to do with the disruptions in Venezuela than with worries about Iraq. Goldman Sachs reckons that the combined impact of Venezuelan and Iraqi disruption has the potential to be the biggest shock in oil-market history, even after allowing for some offsetting increases in supply from other producers. (...)
In any case, Iraq will not be able to turn its oil taps on fully the moment that war ends. Goldman Sachs estimates, therefore, that oil prices may average no lower than $27 over the next 12 months.
(...)According to the IMF's ready reckoner,a $10 increase in oil prices, if sustained for a year, reduces global GDP by 0.6% after one year. (...) They ignore the potentially much bigger impact on confidence and stockmarkets, and they ignore the effects that follow from changes in monetary and fiscal policy.
Ensuite un passage long sur le fait que depuis toujours on sousestime les consequences d'un choc sur les prix du petrole, et que la solution sera cette fois une baisse des taux d'interet, mais que la Fed avec des taux a 1,25% va avoir du mal et que l'UE qui pourrait avec ses 2,75% s'y refuse ou sera tres longue a agir.
Economists are using war fears as a convenient explanation for slower than expected growth—just as they (wrongly) blamed America's recession in 2001 on the September 11th attacks. Bill Dudley, an economist at Goldman Sachs, argues that war fears are not the biggest reason why the economy is soft. Instead, the problems lie deeper: in the excesses built up during the bubble years[pour ceux qui ne comprenent pas, reference a la "bulle speculative" des nouvelles technologies], such as huge private-sector debts, excess capacity, low saving, and a massive current-account deficit. America's over-indebted households, Japan's deflation and its crippled banks, Europe's structural rigidities and its overly tight fiscal and monetary policies: all these mean that the world economy is horribly vulnerable to shocks of any kind.
Trading blows
(...)Another big difference from 1991 is that analysts have already assumed a quick and painless war. Before the Gulf war they were much less confident. So the downside risk today is much greater. A prolonged war could drive property and share prices sharply lower.
(...)How might exchange rates react? The sharp fall in the dollar in recent months may in part be related to war worries. So a quick victory, it is argued, would help the dollar to rally. The dollar bounced by 10% in trade-weighted terms within two months of the end of the Gulf war.
However, there is a big difference this time. (...) This time, America will have to foot most of the bill itself. In 1991, it had a small current-account surplus. Today, with its deficit running at more than 5% of GDP, any dollar recovery is likely to be short-lived.
Beyond the macroeconomic fall-out from war, there is one other big concern: that diplomatic tensions between America and Europe over Iraq could spread beyond war to trade.
(...)
German firms are particularly worried about a loss of business in America.(...)A few American congressmen have already called for restrictions to be imposed on the import of European wine, cheese and military equipment.
There is also talk that American firms might shift their future investments from “old Europe”—France and Germany—into “new European” countries—such as Britain.(...)
On peut aussi trouver un autre article avec pour sous titre : "Governments tend to underestimate the bill" qui nous apprend que toutes les guerres ont couté beaucoup plus que prevues, comme la guerre du vietnam, qui couta plus de 10 fois le montant estimé. Pour William Nordhaus, economiste a la "Yale University", suggere que les guerres sont "disproportionately undertaken by governments that overestimate their chances of victory or underestimate the size of the job."
Conclusion de ce court article :
Saddam Hussein is clearly not accounting for his warmongering. On one estimate, the Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf war and the subsequent economic sanctions have cost Iraq something of the order of two decades-worth of GDP. (This is based on a wide definition of cost, which includes the loss of output and the destruction of capital stock, as well as the military burden on the budget.) That may well be the biggest such economic devastation in modern history.
Et pour le moment j'ai la flemme de traduire quoi que ce soit, j'editerai peut etre ce soir si j'en ai le courage...