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Alpha & Oméga
Provient du message de Bhâal-Bhû-Trix
Pour tuer un homme est-il vraiment nécessaire de balancer des bombes à plus savoir qu'en foutre... Si il voulait vraiment simplement renverser le régime les US enverrait un assassin pour tuer Saddam à l'arrache. (...)
D'autres attendent derrière, tous avec leur ego et envie de pouvoir (restreinte par Saddam Hussein), et en y mêlant des conflits ethniques tour à tour attisés ou étouffés par le régime actuel.
Le problème de la succession (si intervention armée il y a) gouvernementale n'est pas aussi basique que Pan le vilain est mort tout le monde est content.
Le gouvernement Bush a laissé filtré diverses options (dont la plus explicitée est la mise en place d'une tutelle) quant à la suite d'une intervention armée, la plupart des solutions envisagées n'étant que peu du goût des voisins géographiques de l'Irak, voir de la Chine et de la Russie.
Tout ceci amène une fois de plus la réflexion suivante, qui est de légitimer un changement de gouvernement, pour le bien de la population (qui apparaît comme un soudain déclencheur au côté d'intérêts géopolitiques et économiques plus importants mais atténués par la communication pro-intervention), par une action armée extérieure à la nation concernée, en marchant, le droit d'ingérence dans les poches, devant l'ONU, dans ce cas là observateur (cruelle dilemme imposé indirectement aux inspecteurs en passant) du conflit.
A ce sujet, je vous livre quelques extraits de l'éditorial du New York Times, 23 février (long article).
Power and Leadership: The Real Meaning of Iraq
(...) More discussion is the only road that will get the world to the right outcome — concerted effort by a wide coalition of nations to force Saddam Hussein to give up his weapons of mass destruction. We need another debate. Another struggle to make this the United Nations' leadership moment.
Right now, things don't look promising for those of us who believe this is a war worth waging, but only with broad international support. The United States has an invasion force in place, and the military's schedule seems to demand that it attack within a few weeks before spring brings on withering desert heat. (...)
Saddam Hussein, meanwhile, has been skillful at providing the pretense of progress to international inspectors without seriously cooperating. (...)
All this puts an enormous weight on what Iraqi behavior Hans Blix, the chief U.N. inspector, chooses to stress — whether he dwells on Iraqi resistance or points to areas of cooperation. In the United Nations, the equivalent of a C-minus for effort on a Blix report can be taken as an argument for peace, while a D-plus can be seen as a call to war. The inspectors should never be put in the position of deciding international foreign policy.
A Case for Action
While the possibility of Mr. Hussein experiencing a last-minute conversion seems minuscule, there is one quick way to test whether it's possible. Iraq has Al Samoud 2 missiles, weapons it built at great expense and effort. (...)
This week the United Nations should tell Mr. Hussein he must let the inspectors watch him get rid of his missiles immediately, or outside forces will do it for him, with the support of the international community. That clear message would resolve the most frustrating problem for those who want the United Nations to nail down its position as the arbiter of world crises — how to get France and its supporters to define their own bottom line rather than simply criticizing Washington's.
Saddam Hussein is nobody's hero in this story. Although many Americans are puzzled about why the Bush administration chose to pick this fight now, it's not surprising that in the wake of Sept. 11, the president would want to make the world safer, and that one of his top priorities would be eliminating Iraq's ability to create biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. (...)
A Game of Chance
Many foreigners, and large numbers of Americans, wonder whether this administration is capable of dispassionate judgment as it relentlessly pushes for war. (...)
This may be an administration intent on making war, but so far it has also shown itself willing to give the United Nations both time and space to make up its mind.
It seems clear to us that the United Nations should enforce its own orders and make Iraq disarm, even if that requires force. But in the end, sometime in March, the United States may have to decide whether it should do the job on its own.
When that happens, the arguments on both sides are sure to be couched in the highest moral principles. But the real calculations will be entirely about the odds of succeeding. If military victory over Iraq is swift, and if it can be accomplished without extensive casualties to American soldiers or Iraqi civilians or damage to neighboring countries or the area's oil fields, Mr. Bush's popularity will soar. If occupation forces unearth proof of a large nuclear program, stockpiles of terrifying biological weapons and real evidence of serious collusion between Saddam Hussein and international terrorists, many of the international leaders who are riding the crest of anti-Americanism now will start looking very foolish.
But things could go terribly wrong, very quickly. The war could be brutal and protracted, especially if Mr. Hussein unleashes biological or chemical weapons against Israel or American troops. He may also succeed in setting fire to his oil wells, or disabling those in neighboring countries, crippling the world economy. And if he is destroyed, there is every possibility of a vicious struggle for the lucrative spoils among the disparate clans and ethnic groups in Iraq, drawing in Turkey, Iran and others. In the chaos, the weapons of mass destruction Americans went to war to eliminate could wind up being ferried out of Iraq and sold to the highest terrorist bidder. And just as the American military's presence in Saudi Arabia during the gulf war precipitated the growth of Al Qaeda and Sept. 11, the long-term occupation of Iraq will create resentment in the Muslim world that could lead to more, not less, terrorism.
The Long Haul
All those risks, we repeat, are worth taking in the context of a broad international coalition, and some might even be diminished if the world acts together. The country is still traumatized by the discovery on Sept. 11, 2001, that we live in a world of unimaginable danger. Some of our traditional allies knew that already, from long and terrible experience. Some are still trying to face up to it. But the rational response is to work together to make the world safer, not to ignore obvious dangers in hope that the likely will not become inevitable.
Our own guess, when we calculate the odds in Iraq, is that the war is likely to go well in the short run, but that the long run will be messy, difficult and dangerous. If America acts virtually on its own, it is hard to imagine either the Bush administration or the American people having the staying power to make things right. Washington may be counting on Iraq's oil revenue to pay for rebuilding the country after the war, but the oil wells could be damaged in the fighting. It seems certain that an administration that will not give up tax cuts to pay for the war itself is not going to inflict economic pain at home to pay for the cleanup. And while Americans have always shown themselves willing to risk anything, even their own children, for a critical cause of high purpose, their support for this particular fight is thin as a wafer and based on misapprehension that Iraq is clearly linked to terrorism.
Our Bottom Line
When all the odds are calculated, people will have their own particular critical concerns that add weight to one side of the scale or the other. For some, it is the belief that rogue nations can be deterred — a certainty that if they use their worst weapons, the United States and its allies will pay them back, double. While the evidence that Saddam Hussein has used chemical weapons in battle with Iran, and against his own Kurdish population, is strong, the fact that he has not used similar weapons in other situations, including the gulf war, suggests that deterrence should not be dismissed.
For others, the bottom line will come down to saving face. The United States has assembled its forces for invasion, and to back down now, many argue, will be to show a weakness that will encourage our enemies. We don't think the world's only surviving superpower should be making war to avoid embarrassment.
Our own overriding concern runs in the other direction. The United States is, and seems likely to remain, a nation whose military might and economic power so outstrip any other country that much of the world has begun comparing it to ancient Rome. The test now is whether we will find a new way to exercise our power in which leadership, self-discipline and concern for the common good will outweigh our smaller impulses. An invasion of Iraq that is not supported by many traditional allies, or those powers that we need to be allied with in the best possible future, will send a message that we can do whatever we want. But it is not going to make the rest of the world want to root for us to succeed. The real test of American leadership is only incidentally about Iraq. It is whether we will further split the world into squabbling camps, united only by their jealousy of our power, or use our influence to unite it around a shared vision of progress, human rights and mutual responsibility.